W11 Interdepndence and Overreliance – Nida Ali

Interdependence and Overreliance

 

1)  “ We are weaving technologies into our homes, our communities, even our bodies- but even experts have become disturbingly complacent about their shortcomings. The rest of us rarely question them at all…. But what if it’s the harbinger of bigger problems? What is the seed of smart cities own destruction are already built into their DNA? –Buggy, Brittle and Bugged – Smart Cities. Anthony Townsend

“In our research at IOActive Labs, we constantly find very vulnerable technology being used across different industries. This same technology also is used for critical infrastructure without any security testing. Although cities usually rigorously test devices and systems for functionality, resistance to weather conditions, and so on, there is often little or no cyber security testing at all, which is concerning to say the least.”

“When either wireless or wired communications security is poor, an attacker can easily intercept and hijack communications and take control of devices and networks. We see this all the time; most such communications are insecure”. –  Active Hacking – Cesar Cerrudo

 

If smart cities contain bugs within their systems, before these systems are plugged into cities, how do you find the bug or error without plugging it into a city? How can they be tested before they are integrated into a network that effects not just the infrastructure but people as well? Is the system or method of testing prone to flaws as well? Aren’t security systems set up to prevent cyber hacking prone to hacking as well? They may defend the network better but they are also susceptible to attacks and are vulnerable too. How effective are cyber security systems? There are new virus developed everyday, how effective are cyber security softwares and systems? What are their limitations and parameters?

 

2) “The sheer size of city-scale smart systems comes with its own set of problems. Cities and their infrastructure are already the most complex structures humankind has ever created. Interweaving them with equally complex information processing can only multiply the opportunities for bugs and unanticipated interactions.”

“ The pervasiveness of bugs in smart cities is disconcerting. We don’t have a clear grasp of where the biggest risks lie, when and how they will cause systems to fail, or what the chain reaction consequences will be. Who is responsible when a smart city crashes? And how will citizens help debug the city?”

Buggy, Brittle and Bugged – Smart Cities. Anthony Townsend

“There is a huge and unknown attack surface on smarter cities. With so much complexity and interdependency, it is difficult to know what and how everything is exposed. Therefore, simple problems could cause a big impact due to interdependency and chain reactions.20 This is what makes threat modeling so important…Has anyone seen a threat model for a city? Maybe these exist, but I haven’t seen one. Some larger software and services vendors have issued general documents about cyber security in cities but nothing very specific.”

 

“The current attack surface for cities is huge and wide open to attack. This is a real and immediate danger. The more technology a city uses, the more vulnerable to cyber attacks it is, so the smartest cities have the highest risks.”

 

–  Active Hacking – Cesar Cerrudo

City smart systems consist of the physical infrastructure and a digital one, both come with their own set of complications and problems, What approach can lead to this integration, to be less riskier and better fitting? How would one test this integration? Does it depend on the context or the issue, whether a bottom up or top down approach is effective, it also depends on which infrastructure is effected? What type of prototype or model should be built or an actual neighborhood would be taken as a prototype to test such technologies first? Can these systems, which are interdependent on each other, function better if when one is effected it shuts down so as not to effect other systems and back up system takes its place? (parallel circuit and not a series circuit). The malfunction of one network would replace itself with a back up system to prevent the other systems dependent on it to not malfunction. System such as the internet, cloud computing, cellular networks, GPS, sensors, etc. How can these chain reactions be addressed and what countermeasures need to be made or taken in order to prevent a complete system shutdown or malfunction?

 

3) “ In our rush to build smart cities on a foundation of technologies for sensing and control of the world around us, should we be at all surprised when they are turned around to control us?’

“ Thinking about the unthinkable dictated a whole new approach to building cities. By concentrating population, infrastructure, and industrial capacity in nice, big juicy, megaton sized targets they had become a liability in the nuclear age.” …Norbert Weiner, “The decentralization of our cities on the spots on which they stand, plus the release of our whole communications system from the threat of a disastrous tie-up, are reforms which are long overdue… For a city is primarily a communications center serving the same purpose as a nerve center in the body.”

“We will never know if the negative impacts could have been avoided, but it would not have cost much to try. We might have even avoided the very unintended consequences we now invent smart technologies.”

Buggy, Brittle and Bugged – Smart Cities. Anthony Townsend

 

“It’s extremely important: Technologies used by cities must be properly security audited to make certain that they are secure before they are implemented. …. When we see that the data that feeds smart city systems is blindly trusted and can be easily manipulated, that the systems can be easily hacked, and there are security problems everywhere, that is when smart cities become Dumb Cities.”

“The nature of the impact depends on the extent to which a city relies on the services affected.”

–  Active Hacking – Cesar Cerrudo

 

By overseeing and managing the data being fed into and out of smart city systems, how effective would this solution of managing the data be when it comes to the structure of the system? If the system itself has bugs then does the data processing through it matter? To what extent?

If these consequences, (Townsend mentions) were addressed, would they only effect the problem in the short run or the long run? Is the patch, for solving the issue to let the system continue working rather than actually finding the core root of the problem?

Does the weakness or problems in the smart city infrastructure lead to it being called dumb city or does the existence of dumb citizens (participatory) lead to it being called a dumb city? Or the existence of both define the existence of dumb cities? What effects smart cities more, currently: citizens that effect the infrastructure of the city or do the networks or systems integrated in these cities. Can citizens take security into their own hands? How so ? Or do we need specialized companies like IOactive labs to secure our systems? How involved do citizens need to be when addressing such problems?

 

 

 

 

 

Crashing and Hacking the Smart City – Feng

An Emerging US (and World) Threat: Cities Wide Open to Cyber Attacks

  • Smart Cities as a system is subdividing, such as more sensors in different places and undertake different responsibilities. For more efficiency and more accuracy, this kind of subdividing will be continue. However, the whole system will be more weak when there are too much subdividing. One subsystem crash may lead whole failure of system.
    How could we make the stableness of system better in the processing of subdividing?

 

  • Page10

    “Main building systems are run on the Windows XP operating system, which is old, outdated, not supported and less secure than new operating systems….”
    It is a common issue in our life, the update of software and hardware is not synchro. For cities, it is a slow speed for its development but the upgrade of Cyber things is much faster.
    Which is better for a Smart City’s growth, make cities change faster or make software suit cities slower?

    Also, nowadays, lots of companies for their own benefits, do the “Planned Obsolescence”. If the PO will be used in building a smart city, there will be lots profit, and also lots of cost. Companies want the highest profit and the citizens want the lowest cost.
    How to deal with this kind of condition?

Crashing and Hacking the Smart City

Cerrudo, “An Emerging US (and World) Threat: Cities Wide Open to Cyber Attacks,” White Paper

-Sadly cities are implementing new technologies without first testing cyber security, there is often little or no cyber security testing at all, vendors with little or no experience in implementing security features, Many vendors implement custom wireless and wired communication protocols with either very poor security or no security…. Who is responsible or at fault for such lack of knowledge or being carless while implementing technologies in smart city, the government, other private organizations or vendors who designs these devices and technology?

– In our research at IOActive Labs, we constantly find very vulnerable technology being used across different industries. This same technology also is used for critical infrastructure without any security testing. Although cities usually rigorously test devices and systems for functionality, resistance to weather conditions, and so on, there is often little or no cyber security testing at all, which is concerning to say the least (pg.no: 08). Is it always possible to test technology completely and assure that there is no bug? Sometimes a hardware failure can also cause system to fail.

Townsend, “Buggy, Brittle and Bugged,” Smart Cities

-The sheer size of city-scale smart systems comes with its own set of problems. Cities and their infrastructure are already the most complex structure humankind has ever created. Interweaving them with equally complex information processing can only multiply the opportunity for bugs an unanticipated interactions (pg.no:256). Will the bottom up process of building smart cities have minimal chances for bugs and unanticipated interactions?

 

 

Crashing and Hacking the Smart City–Yumeng Chen

Buggy, Brittle and Bugged

–In the case Y2K, the reality is very like the division of labour in society today, people just pay attention to their own duty, which relevance their own benefit only. However, if there’s a issue which brings no benefit or benefit others as well, who will have the motivation to do it?

 

An Emerging US (and World) Threat: Cities Wide Open to Cyber Attacks 

–In page 8, author talks about encryption issues, test process is really big issue. Because it is really depends on specific situation where this system placed. Kind like architecture, why we say it is irreproducible, because even we got the same drawings, we can’t build the same building in 2 places due to the different of weather, environment and even the workers. Same, I think the test should be in the specific location. How do we think about this idea which relates to the cost increasing and the time increasing?

 

–Another thing always comes to my mind is, in order to keep the city security, we have to keep improving the firewall in order to defend the hackers, same like the chip card technology. It’s kind like an abime, since we start with the big data, open source, we start to fight against the hackers. When we began to build smart city, did we consider about the cost of the follow up cost?

Crashing and Hacking the Smart City — Shen

1 Buggy, Brittle, and Bugged

 

From the case 9.11 and US east earthquake in 2011 are showed that creation myths rely on faith as much as fact. It demonstrated how our cyber world could more brittle then we thought. And those are just caused by nature. In fact our cyber world are suffering attack or errors thousand times a day. How could we measure the loss of the cyber broke down? and how’s the restore power of the our society in the future cyber world?      

 

Like the sensor served by it code, every data capture by it are served by own purpose. How to consider the hacker act of hacking system? Hacking bank system and benefit for itself considered as negative? Or hacking government data exposure dark history consider as positive? How could we defined the boundary of the cyber world act? Or could it consider access forbidden data as hacker?

2 An emerging US threat: City Wide Open to Cyber Attacks

There are so many option to break down our cyber world. What if our data infrastructure has been wiped out? Like one day all our individual currency or credit information data has been wiped out. Could we restore our order to our used to be? Is there any crash program to due with certain kinds of issues?

 

 

Crashing and Hacking the Smart City – zhicheng zhang

  1. the reading gives us an example of the failure of a smart toilet and its backup: the physical button. the physical button is the full function of the normal toilet today, Does the smart city have to need a physical backup with the full function of the normal city? or have a basic backup?
  2. besides the physical backup, since the development of smart city will take part in multiple cities, should a city smart city become a backup for another city?
  3. the reading talks about the third disastrous situation the technology emerges at the wrong time. since right now we have some example of the smart city such as Songdo, Hudson Yards. is it better to build a new city like Songdo, then after the city and the moving in citizen adopt the new technology, then tear down the old one and rebuild?

W11. Crashing and Hacking the Smart City – pinelopi

Cerrudo, “An Emerging US (and World) Threat: Cities Wide Open to Cyber Attacks,” White Paper

-To take seriously the arguments of a paper that omits references or draws them from Wikipedia and Amazon is certainly unlikely. As a marketing tool, this white paper presents smartness as synonymous to automation and security, while bugs, glitches, cyber-terrorists or hacktivists pose equally serious dangers to the city (pp.10, 17). The author appears to regard transparency of decision making to be a drawback and presents open data as raw material for attacks (pp.15), yet he seems to reach some conclusions worth considering, such as the need for a fail-safe approach and manual overrides, as well as proper encryption and authentication in software that mediates urban processes. In which ways can digital infrastructure be designed to filter out malicious attacks, but still invite participation? How will this line be drawn and by whom?

-In an attempt to map the attack surface of a smart city, the author applies a deterministic, sequential rhetoric: it all begins with malicious manipulation of information, which creates a false alarm, which causes the wrong behavior change of citizens, which then results at some type of congestion – mobility or energy-wise. Yet, I dare say this effect would mostly appear in u-cities with non-existent legacy organizational systems, as existing cities would probably self-regulate their flows in an alternate way shortly after the disruption – given that their legacy infrastructure would remain in place. How can an analog Plan B be designed for a smart Plan A? What would their common elements consist of?

Townsend, “Buggy, Brittle and Bugged,” Smart Cities: pp.252-281

-As Townsend unfolds the wide spectrum of cyber-sabotage, one may identify that the aftermath is more often than not constructive. In which ways do “zero-day” attacks (pp.267) contribute to the evolution of software by creating links of collaboration between groups of opposing interests? Walking in the shoes of hackers is commonplace for security researchers in their attempt to unveil vulnerabilities [ ex. Beresford of NSS Labs (pp.268), McAfee researchers (pp.269) or Davis of IOActive Labs ( in Cerrudo’s white paper, p.16)].  What are the unlikely perks of cyber-sabotage as a dynamic mechanism for code development?

-As opposed to the demands for decentralization in the 60’s (pp.277), the urban future ahead looks rather centralized according to Glaeser (pp.278). To prevent doomsday scenarios from happening is a bet we cannot afford to lose, but in which ways is a purely centralized strategy more suitable for the task? The potential failures of our cities are complex conglomerations of urban, economic, technological and social parameters. What would the forms of participation and action to address them look like, especially across different scales?

Crashing and Hacking the Smart City

Buggy, Brittle and Bugged – Townsend

It becomes clear that as technology attempts to automate tasks the design for which fails to encapsulate uncertainties and preferences, we will be surrounded with “buggy” infrastructures. This begs the question, Will the smart city have a manual flush option? Or will we be subjects of frequent bugs and glitches at ever growing scales of complexity and relative consequences?

In describing the “First actual case of a bug being found”, Townsend highlights that bugs can be software glitches resultant of coding or physical wear and tear of hardware due to lack of maintenance or unforeseen accidents. Although the public persists to call for an “exposed smart city infrastructure” where citizens can more easily perceive and understand their smart city grid, do they understand the implications doing so could have in increasing the probability of bugs and failures due to tampering?

Is it worth considering that interlacing of the entire city into a centralized smart city infrastructure (due to software interdependencies) vs more analogous, fragmented structures deployed today, that the risk and relative cost of attacks/failures effectively underscores corporations’ promise of increasing efficiency and profitability?

Will fear of tampering with the smart city infrastructure delay / effectively abolish the hope of DIY citizens’ access to smart city “walled gardens”? How can we increase the smart city infrastructure’s resilience against bugs and attacks without walling out citizens and their potential contributions to the infrastructure?

If hacking is considered an expression of agency manifesting in contingent use (exploitation) of certain technologies can we think of hacking in and of itself as a form of citizen participation that prompts constant evolution adding layers of sophistication and resilience to the smart city? Are attacks, bugs and glitches the vaccine to larger scale threats? Much like viral infections are to our immune systems? Consider a group of ethical hacking activists that aim to highlight and expose areas susceptible to infiltration much like citizens report “bugs” in the physical infrastructure (potholes etc) to local authorities today

An emerging US (and World) Threat – Cesar Cerrudo

“What would commuting look like with non functioning traffic control systems” Non technologically-mediated infrastructures have been implemented in a number of areas around Europe and the UK (shared space initiative) and have had “positive” effects – It is feasible to consider where technology should be implemented vs where is can be. In doing so can we preserve our state of functionality more so than if we surrendered everything to a floating buggy infrastructure? Or would we, by doing so, omit seemingly unnecessary technologies from contributing to a larger picture that is yet to be realized?

“How would citizens respond to an inadequate supply of electricity”..etc. Consider the plausibility of a smart city backup structure that is surrendered to the citizens. The equivalent of citizen generators and independently owned and run street lights that kick in in the event of a superstructure bug or attack. Will doing so allow DIY activists to understand the system and actively contribute/inspire future implementations with regards to security and functionality, adding resilience to the smart city infrastructure and concretizing the dialogue between top down implementation and bottom up innovation?

“The public needs to see to believe. Cities are not spurred into action by discussions about suspected vulnerable products and threats” – This reiterates that bugs and hacking are a critical component to strengthening the smart city’s immune system – making it more resilient to devastating attacks and or failures.

An investigation of the weakness of sub structural infrastructures’ security systems begs the question: could their weakness be due to a general under-estimation of the public’s understanding and will to hack, manipulate and repurpose infrastructures in addition to a general complacency with regards to maintenance and upkeep with current technological processes? Is there simply less room for such complacency now?

Presentation Schedule

 

Thursday, April 27

  • Ali, Nida
  • Aranda Brito, Leonardo
  • Chandsarkar, Ruchita
  • Chen, Yumeng
  • Gao, Shen
  • Garzon, Germania Elizabeth
  • Guo, Feng
  • Huezo, Sandra Elizabeth

 

Thursday, May 4

  • Khanuja, Neeta
  • Mahmoud, Karim Mosaad Anwar Noureldien
  • Papadimitraki, Pinelopi
  • Patil, Swapnil Anil
  • Royes, Marcus
  • Salehi, Sepehr
  • Wu, Qiong
  • Yu, Jiaqi
  • Zhang, Zhicheng

The Open Source Urbanism – Feng

Smart Cities

  • P119 “The street finds its own uses for things – uses the manufacturers never imagined.”
    Just like an plastic coca bottle could be modified to a firearms’ silencer, people could also do their own mods on the IoT or open source devices of smart cities. Because those devices are more powerful, then they could be more harmful if they are used in a wrong ways. How to keep the safety in this case? And who have the right and responsibility to manage?

UVS

  • P25 “To design something that does not yet exist, if we are not to build it at the same time, requires us to imagine it and represent it, for example on paper, through plans, in maquette form, or through software simulated fly-through.”
    Designing a thing for future adventurous, people can not fo recast what will show up in future, such as the newest iPhone can not plugin the newest MacBook anymore due to the usb-c. One adapter could solve the small issue for iThings but would it be the same easy for smart cities forecast design? Do we have or should we build some guide for this kind of design?
  • P30 “…a broken system is usually one that attracts the most attention, in part because it appeals to others’ desire to “repair” and also because breaks can enable one to understand better how something should or could work.”
    In the same time, a broken system is also one that will attract the destructive desire of people (Broken windows theory). Some open source softwares are lack to enough money for maintaining then have some security issue. If smart cities use the open way to develop, will it face the same problem?