1
In the feedback-loop interactive model, the user is closely coupled with the dynamic system. Dubberly, Haque and Pangaro note that both the human and the system are unspecified (pp.3). What does that mean? Is the interaction between the user and the dynamic system a process of mutual specification?
Boulding’s diagram maps nine system types of increasing complexity. The fourth level of the Cell is particularly interesting, as it seems to mark the transition from inanimate units to living entities (Dubberly, Haque and Pangaro, pp.7). Autopoetic systems, like cells, can handle unpredictable inputs because of their inherent ‘through-put’. What is a through-put? What kind of information does it consist of? In which ways can it accommodate unpredictable inputs?
If it resembles the genetic code of a cell, does it also evolve over time in response to random inputs?
Also, is the production of space autopoetic? (the relevance, if any, of Schumacher’s “The autopoesis of architecture”?)
2
“Like device protocols and personal conduct, architecture has a form of etiquette” (Khan, pp.162) Etiquettes, as a form of control, define interactions in a definite, but not necessarily deterministic way. Is this suggestive that a truly participatory relationship with our environment should not be mediated by any structures of control? I am wondering if control points empower interactivity, as Galloway, referring to the paradox of protocols, wrote that they “have to standardize in order to liberate” (Galloway, Protocol, 2004, p.95).
I found the notion of interpassivity to be alarmingly familiar in the way digital technologies affect our agency. If “in the interpassive the subject forgoes participation” (Khan, pp164), what does that mean for the citizens’ agency in the Sentient City? In which ways could this transfer of responsibilities alienate us from our civic duties and eventually our citizenship itself?
3
Leaving behind its traditional cartesian foundation, computation is now seeking to appropriate the relationship between embodiment, the quality of being embedded in the world, and sense-making, the way we perceive experience and assign meaning. Throughout the history of interaction, this has been a trajectory where computation moved from representation of the real world (for instance through textual and visual metaphors, Dourish, pp.11-13) to participation in it, as the approach of ‘embodied interaction’ builds on how we perceive through being-in-the-world. Dourish writes that we need to “consider how computation participates in the world it represents”, as it is “fundamentally a representational medium” (pp.20). The question to ask here is, how can a system participate in the environment it represents? Isn’t representation already a filter, an interpretation of the world? How does the representative quality of computation affect its participation in the world?
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